Quantum Private Queries: security analysis by Giovannetti, Vittorio et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
80
9.
19
34
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
1 S
ep
 20
08
Quantum Private Queries: security analysis
Vittorio Giovannetti1, Seth Lloyd2, and Lorenzo Maccone3,
1NEST-CNR-INFM & Scuola Normale Superiore,
Piazza dei Cavalieri 7, I-56126, Pisa, Italy e-mail: v.giovannett@sns.it
2MIT, RLE and Dept. of Mech. Engin. MIT 3-160, 77 Mass. Av., Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
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We present a security analysis of the recently introduced Quantum Private Query (QPQ) protocol.
It is a cheat sensitive quantum protocol to perform a private search on a classical database. It allows
a user to retrieve an item from the database without revealing which item was retrieved, and at
the same time it ensures data privacy of the database (the information that the user can retrieve
in a query is bounded and does not depend on the size of the database). The security analysis is
based on information-disturbance tradeoffs which show that whenever the provider tries to obtain
information on the query, the query (encoded into a quantum system) is disturbed so that the person
querying the database can detect the privacy violation.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Lx, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Mn
I. INTRODUCTION
In its most basic form, the scenario we consider can be
described as follows. On one side we have a provider,
Bob, who controls an ordered classical database com-
posed of N = 2n memory cells. Each cell of the data-
base contains an m bit string, so that the database con-
sists of N strings A0, A1, · · · , AN−1. On the other side,
we have the person querying the database, Alice, who
wants to recover the string associated with a memory
cell (say the j-th one) but at the same time does not
want Bob to know which cell she is interested in (user
privacy). In a purely classical setting the simplest strat-
egy for Alice consists in placing a large number of decoy
queries, i.e. she “hides” her query among a large num-
ber M − 1 of randomly selected queries. In this case,
she will be able to get the information she is looking
for, while limiting Bob’s intrusion in her privacy. [In
fact, the mutual information between Alice’s true query
j and Bob’s estimate of such value is upper bounded by
log2(N/M) − (M − 1)/M log2((N − 1)/(M − 1))]. The
drawbacks associated with such procedures are evident.
First of all, the method does not allow Alice to check
whether Bob is retaining information on her queries.
Moreover, to achieve a high level of privacy Alice is forced
to submit large amounts of fake queries, increasing the
communication cost of the transition: in particular, ab-
solute privacy is obtained only forM = N , i.e. by asking
Bob to send all his database. This may not be acceptable
if the database is huge or if it is an asset for Bob (data
privacy).
User and data privacy are apparently in conflict: the
most straightforward way to obtain user privacy is for Al-
ice to have Bob send her the entire database, leading to
no data privacy whatsoever. Conversely, techniques for
guaranteeing the server’s data privacy typically leave the
user vulnerable [1]. At the information theoretical level,
this problem has been formalized as the Symmetrically-
Private Information Retrieval (SPIR) [1] generalizing the
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) problem [2, 3] which
deals with user privacy alone. SPIR is closely related
to oblivious transfer [4], in which Bob sends to Alice N
bits, out of which Alice can access exactly one–which
one, Bob doesn’t know. No efficient solutions in terms of
communication complexity [5] are known for SPIR. In-
deed, even rephrasing them at a quantum level [6, 7], the
best known solution for the SPIR problem (with a single
database server) employs O(N) qubits to be exchanged
between the server and the user, and ensures data pri-
vacy only in the case of honest users (i.e. users who do
not want to compromise their chances of getting the in-
formation about the selected item in order to get more).
Better performance is obtained for the case of multiple
non-mutually communicating servers [2] (although the
user cannot have any guarantee that the servers are not
secretly cooperating to violate her privacy), while sub-
linear communication complexity is possible under the
some computational complexity assumption, e.g. [3]. PIR
admits protocols that are more efficient in terms of com-
munication complexity [2, 3].
The Quantum Private Queries (QPQ) protocol we have
introduced in Ref. [8] is a cheat sensitive strategy [9]
which addresses both user and data privacy while al-
lowing an exponential reduction in the communication
and computational complexity with respect to the best
(quantum or classical) single-server SPIR protocol pro-
posed so far. Specifically QPQ provides a method to
check whether or not Bob is cheating and does not need
the exchange of the whole database (i.e. O(N) qubits):
in its simplest form it only requires Bob to transfer two
database elements, identified by O(logN) qubits, for each
query. The QPQ protocol is ideally composed by a pre-
liminary signaling stage where the user and the database
provider exchange some quantum messages (specifically
Alice addresses Bob receiving some feedback from him)
and by a subsequent retrieval&check stage where Alice
performs some simple quantum information processing
on the received messages to recover the information she
is interested in and to check Bob’s honesty. The QPQ
security relies on the fact that if Bob tries to infer the
2query Alice is looking for, she has a nonzero probability of
discovering it. Most importantly, one can verify that the
more information Bob gets on Alice query, the higher is
the probability that he will not pass Alice’s honesty test.
In this paper we will derive analytical bounds for such a
theoretical trade-off, and we analyze different variants of
the QPQ protocol.
The main idea behind the protocol is the following.
Alice submits her request to Bob using some quantum
information carrier, so that she can either submit a
plain query |j〉 or a quantum superposition of different
queries α|j〉 + β|j′〉. Alice randomly alternates super-
posed queries and non-superposed queries. Thus, Bob
does not know whether the request he is receiving at any
given time is a superposition of queries or not, so that
he does not know which measurement will leave the in-
formation carrier unperturbed: he cannot extract infor-
mation without risking to introduce a disturbance that
Alice can detect. Bob can, however, respond to Alice’s
request without knowing which kind of query was sub-
mitted. His response will be either of the form |j〉|Aj〉 or
of the form α|j〉|Aj〉 + β|j′〉|Aj′ 〉, where the first ket is
the register that Alice had sent him, the second ket is a
register that contains Bob’s answer (Ai being the answer
to the ith query), and which may be entangled with the
first. From these answers Alice can both obtain the reply
to her query and check that Bob has not tried to breach
her privacy.
The main assumption we adopt is that, for each j,
there exists a unique answer string Aj that can be in-
dependently checked by Alice. [This does not prevent
different queries from having the same answer: indeed
we do admit the possibility to have Aj = Aj′ for j 6= j′.]
For example, Alice may be asking Bob the prime fac-
tors of one out of N very large integer numbers (say the
RSA collection) which she cannot factorize by herself.
The above requirements can be relaxed (examples will be
provided in Sec. VII), but they are useful as they permit
a considerable simplification of the security proof. For
the same reason, we will focus on the simplest version of
the QPQ protocol, where there exists a reference query
0 (dubbed rhetoric query) which has a known standard
answer A0. As discussed in Ref. [8], this assumption is
not fundamental, but it is very useful since it allows us
to minimize the amount of exchanged signals in the pro-
tocol (as a matter of fact alternative versions of the QPQ
protocol with higher security level can be devised which
do not employ the rhetoric query).
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we de-
scribe the rhetoric version of QPQ in its basic form and
introduce the notation. This is followed by the techni-
cal Sec. III where we analyze in detail the most general
transformations Bob can perform on Alice’s queries. Sec-
tion IV contains the main result of the paper: here we
introduce the trade-off between Bob’s information on Al-
ice’s query and the success probability of him passing her
honesty test. In Sec. V we present some variations of the
QPQ protocol, one of which exploits entanglement as a
b
database
ALICE BOB
database
Scenario
ALICE BOB
database
a Scenario
database
FIG. 1: Scheme of the QPQ protocol with rhetoric questions.
Alice wants to find out the jth record of Bob’s database (com-
posed of N = 2n records). She then prepares two n-qubit
registers. The first contains the state |j〉Q, while the second
contains the quantum superposition (|j〉Q+|0〉Q)/
√
2 between
her query and the rhetoric question “0”, to which she knows
the standard answer A0. She then sends, in random order
(i.e. randomly choosing either scenario a or scenario b), these
two registers to Bob, waiting for his first reply before sending
the next register. Bob uses each of the two registers to inter-
rogate his database using a qRAM device, which records the
reply to her queries in the two “reply” registers R. At the
end of their exchange, Alice possesses the states |j〉Q|Aj〉R
and (|j〉Q|Aj〉R+ |0〉Q|A0〉R)/
√
2, where the Aj is the content
of the jth record in the database. By measuring the first she
obtains the value of Aj , with which she can check whether
the superposition in the second state was preserved. If this
is not the case, then she can be confident Bob that Bob has
violated her privacy, and has tried to obtain information on
what j was.
resource to strengthen Alice’s privacy. Finally in Sec. VI
we analyze what happens when relaxing some of the as-
sumptions adopted in the security proof. In particular we
show that the basic version of the QPQ described here
does not guarantee privacy if the queries have multiple
answers, and we point out a possible solution in Sec. VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
In the rhetoric version of the QPQ protocol (see Fig. 1)
Alice uses two quantum registers each time she needs
to interrogate Bob’s database. The first register con-
tains |j〉, the address of the database memory cell she is
interested in; the other register is prepared in a quan-
tum superposition of the type (|j〉 + |0〉)/√2, “0” be-
ing the rhetoric query. Alice then secretly and randomly
chooses one of the two registers and sends it to Bob.
He returns the register Alice has sent to him, together
with an extra register in which the corresponding an-
swer is encoded. In order to reply to Alice’s query with-
out knowing whether it is the superposed query or not,
Bob needs to employ the quantum random access mem-
ory (qRAM) algorithm [10, 11]. After Alice has received
Bob’s first reply, she sends her second register and waits
for Bob’s second reply. Again Bob returns her register
together with an extra register which encodes his reply
obtained through a qRAM application. If Bob has fol-
3lowed the protocol accurately, without trying to extract
information, Alice now should possess a state which en-
codes the information she is looking for and an entan-
gled state involving the rhetoric query, whose coherence
can be tested to check Bob honesty, i.e. the two states
|j〉|Aj〉 and (|j〉|Aj〉 + |0〉|A0〉)/
√
2. Alice recovers the
value of Aj by measuring the second register in the first
state, and then she uses this value to prepare a measure-
ment to test whether the superposition has been retained
in the second state (“honesty test”). Such a measure-
ment is simply a projective measurement on the state
(|j〉|Aj〉 + |0〉|A0〉)/
√
2. If this test fails, namely if she
finds out that the state Bob has sent her back is orthog-
onal to the one she is expecting, she can be confident that
Bob has cheated and has violated her privacy. If, instead,
the test passes, she cannot conclude anything. In fact,
suppose that Bob has measured the state and collapsed
it to the form |j〉|Aj〉 or to the form |0〉|A0〉, it still has
a probability 1/2 to pass Alice’s test of it being of the
form (|j〉|Aj〉+ |0〉|A0〉)/
√
2. So Alice’s cheat test allows
her to be confident that Bob has cheated if the test fails,
but she can never be completely confident that Bob has
not cheated if the test passes.
We now introduce the notation which will be used. We
define X ≡ {0, 1, · · · , N−1} the source space which con-
tains the addresses j of the memory cells which compose
Bob’s database, identifying with j = 0 the address of
the rhetoric query. For each j we define Aj to be the
information associated with the j-th address. As men-
tioned in the introduction the Aj are classical messages
composed of m bits, and they need not represent distinct
messages (i.e. we allow the possibility that Aj = Aj′ for
j 6= j′), but they are uniquely determined by the value
of j. In this context, Bob’s database is defined as the
ordered set D ≡ {Aj |j ∈ X} formed by the strings Aj .
We define Q = Q1, Q2 the two quantum registers Alice
uses to submit her queries; according to the protocol, she
will first send Q1, wait for Bob’s answer and then send
Q2. In this notation, for k = 1, 2, the vector |j〉Qk is the
state of the k-th register which carries the address of the
j-th database memory. For all j 6= 0 we use the vector
|+ j〉Qk to represent the superposition of the j-th query
and the rhetoric query, i.e.
|+ j〉Qk ≡ (|j〉Qk + |0〉Qk)/
√
2 , (1)
(for j = 0 we have | + 0〉Qk ≡ |0〉Qk). We define R ≡
R1, R2 the registers on which Bob writes the information
to send back to Alice. After having received Q1 from
Alice, Bob encodes the necessary information on R1 and
sends back to her both Q1 and R1. Analogously, after
having receivedQ2, he will encode information on R2 and
send her back both Q2 and R2. It is useful to also define
the vectors
|Cj〉Q1R1 ≡ |j〉Q1 |Aj〉R1 , (2)
|C±j〉QkRk ≡ (|Cj〉QkRk ± |C0〉QkRk)/
√
2 , (3)
(as in Eq. (1) for j = 0 we set |C+0〉QkRk ≡ |C0〉QkRk).
According to the protocol, the vectors |Cj〉QkRk or
|C+j〉QkRk are the states that an honest Bob should send
back to Alice when she is preparing Qk into the states
|j〉Qk or |+j〉Qk , respectively. In fact, the states |Cj〉QkRk
and |C+j〉QkRk are the result of the qRAM transforma-
tion when it is fed |j〉Qk and | + j〉Qk , respectively. We
also introduce an ancillary system B to represent any
auxiliary systems that Bob may employ when perform-
ing his local transformation on the Alice queries, plus
(possibly) an external environment.
Let us use this notation to better formalize the QPQ
protocol described above. Suppose then that Alice wants
to address the j-th entry of the database. The protocol
goes as follows:
1. Alice randomly chooses between the two alternative
scenarios a and b (see Fig. 1). In the scenario a, she
prepares the qubits Q1 in |j〉Q1 and the qubits Q2
in |+ j〉Q2 . Instead, in the scenario b she prepares
the states | + j〉Q1 and |j〉Q2 . This means that, in
the scenario a, she first sends the plain query and
then the superposed query. On the contrary, in the
scenario b, she first sends the superposed query and
then the plain query. Consequently, the input state
of the system QRB is described by the vectors
|Ψ(ℓ)j 〉QRB ≡


|j〉Q1 |+ j〉Q2 |000〉RB for ℓ =a,
|+ j〉Q1 |j〉Q2 |000〉RB for ℓ =b,
(4)
where the index ℓ refers to the selected scenario and
|000〉RB is the fiducial initial state of the systems
R = R1R2 and B (it is independent on ℓ because
Bob does not know which scenario Alice has cho-
sen).
2. Now Alice sends Q1 and waits until Bob gives her
back Q1 and R1. Then, she sends Q2 and waits
until she gets back Q2 and R2.
3. Honesty Test: Alice checks the states she has re-
ceived. If she had selected scenario a, she per-
forms a von Neumann measurement to see if QR is
in the state |Cj〉Q1R1 |C+j〉Q2R2— see Eq. (3). Of
course, this can be done in two steps: first she mea-
sures Q1R1 to learn Aj and then she uses this value
to prepare an appropriate measurement on Q2R2.
If the measurement fails, then Alice can definitely
conclude that Bob was cheating, otherwise she can
assume he was honest (although she has no guaran-
tee of it). If she had chosen scenario b, she proceeds
analogously, using a von Neumann measurement to
check if QR is in the state |Cj〉Q2R2 |C+j〉Q1R1 .
III. BOB’S TRANSFORMATIONS
In the QPQ protocol, Alice’s privacy relies essentially
on the fact that Bob is not allowed to operate jointly on
Q1 and Q2. This a fundamental constraint: without it,
4Bob would be able to discover the index j without Alice
knowing it. In fact, the subspaces Hj spanned by the
two vectors |j〉Q1 | + j〉Q2 and | + j〉Q1 |j〉Q2 (associated
to the two different scenarios a and b for the query j)
are mutually orthogonal. Thus, such vectors (and then
the corresponding queries) could be easily distinguished
by performing on Q1Q2 a simple von Neumann measure-
ment defined by the projectors associated with the spaces
Hj . This is a measurement that would allow Bob to re-
cover Alice’s query without disturbing the input states of
Q1Q2. To prevent this cheating strategy, the QPQ pro-
tocol forces Bob to address Q1 and Q2 separately (i.e. he
has to send the register Q1 back, before Alice provides
him the register Q2).
Bob’s action when he receives Alice’s first register can
be described by a unitary operator U
(1)
Q1RB
which acts
on the first register Q1, on R = R1R2, and on B (and
not on the second register Q2 which is still in Alice’s
possession). Analogously, Bob’s action when he receives
the second register is described by the unitary operator
U
(2)
Q2R2B
which acts on Q2, R2, and B (and not on Q1
and R1 which are now in Alice’s possession). [Note that
the above framework describes also the situation in which
Bob is employing non-unitary transformations (i.e. CP-
maps), since the space B can be thought to contain also
the Naimark extension that transforms any CP-map into
a unitary.] The above transformations cannot depend
on the selected scenario ℓ (as Bob does not know which
one, among ℓ =a and ℓ =b, has been selected by Alice).
Therefore, within the ℓth scenario, the global state at the
end of the protocol is described by the vectors
|Ξ(ℓ)j 〉QRB ≡ U (2)Q2R2BU
(1)
Q1RB
|Ψ(ℓ)j 〉QRB , (5)
with |Ψ(ℓ)j 〉QRB given in Eq. (4).
A. Some useful decompositions
Consider the transformation U (1). In the scenario a
for all j we can write
U
(1)
Q1RB
(|j〉Q1 |000〉RB) (6)
=
√
η
(1)
j |Cj ; Φ(1)j 〉Q1RB +
√
1− η(1)j |V (1)j 〉Q1RB ,
where |Cj ; Φ(1)j 〉Q1RB stands for the separable state
|Cj〉Q1R1 |Φ(1)j 〉R2B and where |V (1)j 〉Q1RB is a vector or-
thogonal to |Cj〉Q1R1 , i.e.
Q1R1〈Cj |V (1)j 〉Q1RB = 0 . (7)
With this choice, η
(1)
j is the probability that the state (6)
will be found in |Cj〉Q1R1 . In the scenario b, instead, for
j 6= 0 we can write
U
(1)
A1RB
(|+ j〉Q1 |000〉RB
)
(8)
=
√
η
(1)
j |C+j ; Φ
(1)
j 〉Q1RB +
√
1− η(1)j |V
(1)
j 〉Q1RB.
As before |C+j ; Φ(1)j 〉Q1RB ≡ |C+j〉Q1R1 |Φ
(1)
j 〉Q1RB and
|V (1)j 〉Q1RB is a vector orthogonal to the “check state”
|C+j〉Q1R1 Alice is expecting, i.e.
Q1R1〈C+j |V
(1)
j 〉Q1RB = 0 . (9)
Consequently η
(1)
j is the probability that the state (8)
will pass the test of being in |C+j〉Q1R1 . The state on
the first line of Eq. (8) can be expanded on a basis of
which the state on the first line of Eq. (6) is a component.
Therefore η
(1)
j and η
(1)
j must be related. The security
analysis given in the following sections is based on the
study of this relation.
Analogous decompositions can be given for U (2): in
this case, however, it is useful to describe them not in
terms of the input states, but in terms of the state of
the system after it has passed the test on the subsystems
Q1R1. For j 6= 0, in the scenario a this gives:
U
(2)
Q2R2B
(
|+ j〉Q2 |Φ(1)j 〉R2B
)
(10)
=
√
η
(2)
j |C+j ; Φ
(2)
j 〉Q2R2B +
√
1− η(2)j |V
(2)
j 〉Q2R2B .
Here |V (2)j 〉Q2R2B is a vector orthogonal to |C+j〉Q2R2 of
Eq. (3) i.e.
Q2R2〈C+j |V
(2)
j 〉Q2R2B = 0 .
Thus η
(2)
j is the probability that the state (10) will pass
the test of being in |C+j〉Q2R2 . Notice that the vector
|Φ(1)j 〉R2B in the first line of Eq. (10) is the state of R2B
one obtains in the scenario a if, after the first round,
the state Q1R1 passes the test of being |Cj〉Q1R1 — see
Eq. (6). In the scenario b, instead, we have
U
(2)
Q2RB
(
|j〉Q2 |Φ
(1)
j 〉R2B
)
(11)
=
√
η
(2)
j |Cj ; Φ(2)j 〉Q2R2B +
√
1− η(2)j |V (2)j 〉Q2R2B,
where |V (2)j 〉Q2R2B is a vector orthogonal to the state
|Cj〉Q2R2 , i.e.
Q2R2〈Cj |V (2)j 〉Q2R2B = 0 ,
and η
(2)
j is the probability that the state (11) will be
found in |Cj〉Q2R2 .
The case j = 0 has to be treated separately: indeed, if
Alice sends this query then both Q1 and Q2 will be pre-
pared into |0〉. In this case, it is then useful to define U (2)
by considering its action on the vector |0〉Q2 |Φ(1)0 〉R2B
with |Φ(1)0 〉R2B defined as in Eq. (6), i.e.
U
(2)
Q2RB
(
|0〉Q2 |Φ(1)0 〉R2B
)
(12)
=
√
η
(2)
0 |C0; Φ(2)0 〉Q2R2B +
√
1− η(2)0 |V (2)0 〉Q2R2B,
5where again one has
Q2R2〈C0|V (2)0 〉Q2R2B = 0 .
From the above equations, it follows that for j 6= 0 the
final state (5), after Bob has finished his manipulations,
can be written as follows for scenario a
|Ξ(a)j 〉 =
√
η
(1)
j η
(2)
j |C+j〉Q2R2 |Cj〉Q1R1 |Φ
(2)
j 〉B
+
√
η
(1)
j (1 − η(2)j ) |Cj〉Q1R1 |V
(2)
j 〉Q2R2B
+
√
1− η(1)j U (2)Q2R2B|+ j〉Q2 |V
(1)
j 〉Q1RB, (13)
where all the terms in the second and third line are or-
thogonal to |C+j〉Q2R2 |Cj〉Q1R1 . Analogously, we have
for scenario b
|Ξ(b)j 〉 =
√
η
(1)
j η
(2)
j |Cj〉Q2R2 |C+j〉Q1R1 |Φ(2)j 〉B
+
√
η
(1)
j (1− η(2)j ) |C+j〉Q1R1 |V (2)j 〉Q2R2B
+
√
1− η(1)j U (2)Q2R2B|j〉Q2 |V
(1)
j 〉Q1RB , (14)
where, again, the states in the last two lines are orthog-
onal to the state in the first. Instead, for j = 0 we have
|Ξ(a,b)0 〉 =
√
η
(1)
0 η
(2)
0 |C0〉Q2R2 |C0〉Q1R1 |Φ(2)0 〉B
+
√
η
(1)
0 (1− η(2)0 ) |C0〉Q1R1 |V (2)0 〉Q2R2B
+
√
1− η(1)0 U (2)Q2R2B |0〉Q2 |V
(1)
0 〉Q1RB . (15)
IV. INFORMATION-DISTURBANCE
TRADEOFF AND PRIVACY
In this section we present an information-disturbance
analysis of the QPQ protocol. This will yield a trade-off
which shows that, if Bob tries to get some information
on Alice’s queries, then she has a nonzero probability of
detecting that he is cheating. The same analysis can be
easily reproduced for more complicated versions of the
protocol. For instance Alice may hide her queries into
superpositions of randomly selected queries. In this case,
the derivation, although more involved, is a straightfor-
ward generalization of the one presented here.
According to Eq. (5), to measure Bob’s information
gain, it is sufficient to study how the final state of the
ancillary subsystem B depends upon Alice’s query j. Ex-
ploiting the decompositions introduced in Sec. III we can
then show that one can force B to keep no track of Al-
ice’s query by bounding the success probabilities that
Bob will pass the QPQ honesty test. Specifically, indi-
cating with P
(ℓ)
j the success probability associated with
Alice’s query j in the ℓ-th scenario and defining ρ
(ℓ)
B (j)
the corresponding output state of B, in Sec. IVA we will
prove the following theorem
Theorem: Choose ǫ ∈ [0, 1] so that P (ℓ)j > 1 − ǫ for
all j and ℓ. Then there exists a state σ∗B of B and a
positive constant c ≤ 631 such that the fidelities [12]
F (ρ
(ℓ)
B (j);σ
∗
B) are bounded as follows,
|F (ρ(ℓ)B (j);σ∗B)− 1| < c ǫ1/4 , (16)
for all all j and ℓ.
This implies that, by requiring Bob’s probabilities of
passing the honesty test to be higher than a certain
threshold 1 − ǫ, then the final states of B will be forced
in the vicinity of a common fixed state σ∗B , which is inde-
pendent from the choice of j and ℓ. This in turn implies
that, for sufficiently small values of ǫ, Bob will not be
able to distinguish reliably between different values of j
using the states in his possession at the end of the pro-
tocol. In particular, if ǫ = 0, i.e. if Bob wants to be
sure that he passes the honesty test, then the final states
for any choice of j will coincide with σ∗B, i.e. they will
be completely independent from j: he cannot retain any
memory of what Alice’s query was. It is also worth notic-
ing that since the total number of queries, as well as the
number of scenarios ℓ, is finite and randomly selected by
Alice, then the requirement on P
(ℓ)
j in the theorem can be
replaced by a similar condition on the average probability
of success[18].
In Sec. IVB we will employ the above theorem to
bound the mutual information I [13] that connects the
classical variable j ∈ {1, · · · , N − 1}, which labels Alice’s
query, and Bob’s estimation of this variable. Assuming
that initially Bob does not have any prior information
on the value of j that Alice is interested in, we will de-
termine the value I at the end of the protocol, showing
that this quantity is upper-bounded by the parameter ǫ
of Eq. (16). Specifically, we will show that by requir-
ing that Bob passes the honesty test with a probability
greater than 1− ǫ, then Alice can bound Bob’s informa-
tion as
I ≤ c ǫ1/4 log2N , (17)
N being the number of database entries: his information
is upper bounded by a quantity that depends monotoni-
cally on a lower bound to his probability P
(ℓ)
j of passing
the honesty test. Thus, if he wants to pass the honesty
test with high probability, he must retain a low informa-
tion on Alice’s query.
A. Proof of the Theorem
Assume that Alice randomly chooses the scenarios a
and b with probability 1/2. From Eqs. (13) and (14) it
is easy to verify that the success probability that Bob
will pass the honesty test when Alice is submitting the
j-th query is
Pj =
1
2
(
P
(a)
j + P
(b)
j
)
= 12
(
η
(1)
j η
(2)
j + η
(2)
j η
(1)
j
)
, (18)
6where P
(a)
j ≡ η(1)j η(2)j and P (b)j ≡ η(2)j η(1)j refer to the
success probabilities in the scenarios a and b, respec-
tively (these expressions hold also for j = 0 by setting
η
(1,2)
0 ≡ η(1,2)0 ). The corresponding output density ma-
trices of the ancillary system B is given by
ρB(j) =
1
2
[
ρ
(a)
B (j) + ρ
(b)
B (j)
]
, (19)
where, for ℓ = a and b, the state ρ
(ℓ)
B (j) are obtained
by partial tracing on Alice’s spaces the output vectors of
Eqs. (13) and (14), i.e.
ρ
(ℓ)
B (j) ≡ TrQR[|Ξ(ℓ)j 〉〈Ξ(ℓ)j |]
= P
(ℓ)
j σ
(ℓ)
B (j) +
[
1− P (ℓ)j
]
σ˜
(ℓ)
B (j), (20)
with
σ
(a)
B (j) ≡ |Φ
(2)
j 〉B〈Φ
(2)
j | , (21)
σ
(b)
B (j) ≡ |Φ(2)j 〉B〈Φ(2)j |. (22)
The quantities σ
(ℓ)
B (j) (for ℓ = a and b) are the density
matrices obtained by projecting |Ξ(ℓ)j 〉QRB into the state
of QR which allows Bob to pass the honesty test (i.e.
|Cj〉Q1R1 |C+j〉Q2R2 for ℓ =a and |C+j〉Q1R1 |Cj〉Q2R2 for
ℓ =b ).
In accordance with the theorem’s hypothesis, we con-
sider the case in which the probability of passing the
test (18) for an arbitrary j is higher than a certain thresh-
old, i.e.
P
(ℓ)
j > 1− ǫ , (23)
with ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. We will then prove Eq. (16) by identifying
the density matrix σ∗B with the pure |Φ(2)0 〉 defined as in
Eq. (13) and showing that the following condition holds
F (ρ
(ℓ)
B (j), |Φ(2)0 〉) > 1− 631 ǫ1/4 , (24)
where F is the fidelity [12]. Such inequality is a con-
sequence of the fact that we want Bob to preserve the
coherence of the superposition | + j〉, and at the same
time to answer correctly to query |j〉. To derive it we use
Eq. (20) and the condition (23) to write
F (ρ
(ℓ)
B (j), |Φ(2)0 〉) ≥ (1− ǫ) F (σ(ℓ)B (j), |Φ(2)0 〉) . (25)
To prove Eq. (24) it is then sufficient to verify that for
all j one has
F (σ
(a)
B (j), |Φ(2)0 〉) = |〈Φ(2)j |Φ(2)0 〉|2 > 1− 630ǫ1/4 ,
F (σ
(b)
B (j), |Φ(2)0 〉) = |〈Φ
(2)
j |Φ(2)0 〉|2 > 1− 630ǫ1/4.(26)
The derivation is similar to the one used in Ref. [14] and
can be split in two parts, which will be derived in the
following:
i) First we use Eq. (23) and the definitions (6) and (8)
to show that for for all j 6= 0 one has
|〈Φ(1)j |Φ(1)0 〉|2 > 1− 28
√
ǫ, (27)
|〈Φ(1)j |Φ(1)0 〉|2 > [1− 2(2 +
√
2ǫ)
√
ǫ]2 > 1− 14√ǫ.(28)
ii) Then we use Eqs. (27), (28) and the definitions (10)
and (11) to verify that for j 6= 0 one has
|〈Φ(2)j |Φ(2)0 〉|2 > (1− 315 ǫ1/4)2 > 1− 630ǫ1/4, (29)
|〈Φ(2)j |Φ(2)0 〉|2 > (1− 23 ǫ1/4)2 > 1− 46ǫ1/4, (30)
which proves the theorem with c = 630.
Derivation of Part i)
The condition (23) implies the following inequalities
η
(1,2)
j > 1− ǫ , η(1,2)j > 1− ǫ , (31)
for all j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N−1}. To obtain inequality (27), we
compare Eqs. (6) and (8) under the constraint imposed
by Eqs. (31). In particular, we notice that for j 6= 0
Eq. (6) gives
U
(1)
Q1RB
(|+ j〉Q1 |000〉RB) = |Wj〉Q1RB + |∆Wj〉Q1RB,(32)
with
|Wj〉 =
q
η
(1)
j
|Cj ;Φ(1)j 〉+
q
η
(1)
0 |C0;Φ(1)0 〉√
2
|∆Wj〉 =
q
1−η(1)
j
|V (1)
j
〉+
q
1−η(1)0 |V (1)0 〉√
2
, (33)
According to Eq. (31), the vector |∆Wj〉Q1RB has a norm
of the order ǫ. This implies that for ǫ ≪ 1 the vec-
tor (32) almost coincides with |Wj〉Q1RB. Analogously,
Eq. (8) and the second inequality of Eq. (31) tell us
that for ǫ ≪ 1, the state U (1)A1RB (|+ j〉Q1 |000〉RB) al-
most coincides with the vector |C+j ; Φ(1)j 〉Q1RB . Combin-
ing these two observations, it follows that for ǫ ≪ 1 the
vectors |Wj〉Q1RB and |C+j ; Φ
(1)
j 〉Q1RB almost coincide.
According to definition (3), this implies that |Φ(1)j 〉R2B,
|Φ(1)0 〉R2B and |Φ
(1)
j 〉R2B must converge for ǫ → 0. To
make this statement quantitatively precise, evaluate the
scalar product between Eqs. (32) and (8), and obtain the
identity
1 =
√
η
(1)
j 〈Wj |C+j ; Φ
(1)
j 〉+
√
1− η(1)j 〈Wj |V
(1)
j 〉 (34)
+
√
η
(1)
j 〈∆Wj |C+j ; Φ
(1)
j 〉+
√
1− η(1)j 〈∆Wj |V
(1)
j 〉.
It can be simplified by using the following inequalities:
|〈Wj |C+j ; Φ(1)j 〉| ≤
q
η
(1)
j
∣∣〈Φ(1)
j
|Φ(1)j 〉
∣∣+qη(1)0
∣∣〈Φ(1)0 |Φ(1)j 〉
∣∣
2 ,
|〈Wj |V (1)j 〉| ≤ 1,
|〈∆Wj |C+j ; Φ(1)j 〉| <
√
ǫ, |〈∆Wj |V (1)j 〉| <
√
2ǫ,
7which can be easily derived from Eq. (33) by invoking
the orthogonality conditions (9). Replacing the above
expressions into Eq. (34) we get
1 <
q
η
(1)
j
η
(1)
j
2
∣∣〈Φ(1)j |Φ(1)j 〉
∣∣+
q
η
(1)
j
η
(1)
0
2
∣∣〈Φ(1)0 |Φ(1)j 〉
∣∣
+2
√
ǫ+
√
2 ǫ , (35)
which implies
∣∣〈Φ(1)0 |Φ(1)j 〉
∣∣ > 1− 2
(
2 +
√
2 ǫ
)√
ǫ , (36)
∣∣〈Φ(1)j |Φ(1)j 〉
∣∣ > 1− 2
(
2 +
√
2 ǫ
)√
ǫ . (37)
We are almost there: indeed Eq. (36) coincides with
Eq. (28). To derive Eq. (27) we apply the triangular
inequality to the vectors |Φ(1)0 〉, |Φ(1)j 〉 and |Φ
(1)
j 〉.
Derivation of Part ii)
The main difference between the set of Eqs. (6), (8) and
the set of Eqs. (10), (11) is the fact that, in the former,
U (1) acts on vectors with fixed RB component, while, in
the latter, U (2) operates on vectors whose R2B compo-
nents may vary with j. We can take care of this by re-
placing |Φ(1)j 〉R2B and |Φ
(1)
j 〉R2B with the constant vector
|Φ(1)0 〉R2B. This is, of course, not surprising, given the in-
equalities of Eqs. (27) and (28). To see it explicitly, eval-
uate the scalar product between U
(2)
Q2RB
(
|j〉Q2 |Φ
(1)
j 〉R2B
)
and U
(2)
Q2RB
(
|j〉Q2 |Φ(1)0 〉R2B
)
. For j 6= 0 it gives,
〈Φ(1)j |Φ(1)0 〉 =
√
η
(2)
j 〈Cj ; Φ(2)j |U (2)|j; Φ(1)0 〉
+
√
1− η(2)j 〈V (2)j |U (2)|j; Φ(1)0 〉 . (38)
From the inequalities (31) and (28), it then follows that
the modulus of κj ≡ 〈Cj ; Φ(2)j |U (2)|j; Φ(1)0 〉 must be close
to one, i.e.
|κj | > 1− (5 + 2
√
2ǫ)
√
ǫ > 1− 8√ǫ . (39)
Proceeding analogously for the vectors U (2)| + j; Φ(1)0 〉
and U (2)|C+j ; Φ(2)j 〉, we obtain
|κj | ≡ |〈C+j Φ(2)j |U (2)|+ j Φ(1)0 〉| > 1− 29
√
ǫ . (40)
For all j 6= 0 we can then write the following decomposi-
tions:
U
(2)
Q2RB
(|j〉Q2 |Φ(1)0 〉R2B) = κj |Cj ; Φ(2)j 〉Q2R2B (41)
+
√
1− |κj |2|Zj〉Q2R2B
U
(2)
Q2R2B
(|+ j〉Q2 |Φ(1)0 〉R2B) = κj |C+j ; Φ
(2)
j 〉Q2R2B (42)
+
√
1− |κj |2 |Zj〉Q2R2B ,
where |Zj〉 and |Zj〉 are vectors orthogonal to |Cj ; Φ(2)j 〉
and |C+j ; Φ(2)j 〉 respectively. The inequality (30) can now
be derived by taking the scalar product between Eqs. (42)
and (13), remembering that |V (2)0 〉 is orthogonal to |C0〉
and using Eqs. (31) and (40). To derive Eq. (29), instead,
we first evaluate the scalar product between Eqs. (41) and
(42) obtaining
|〈Φ(2)j |Φ(2)j 〉| > 1−
√
2[4 + 5
√
58]ǫ1/4 > 1− 60 ǫ1/4 ,
and then we impose the triangular inequality between the
vectors |Φ(2)j 〉, |Φ(2)j 〉 and |Φ(2)0 〉.
B. A bound on Bob’s information
Here we give an upper bound to Bob’s information on
the variable j. This can be done by noticing that we can
treat B as a quantum source which encodes the classi-
cal information produced by the classical random source
X . Specifically, this quantum source will be character-
ized by the quantum ensemble E ≡ {pj = 1/N, ρB(j)},
where pj = 1/N is Alice’s probability of selecting the j-
th query, and ρB(j) is given by Eq. (19). We can then
give an upper bound to Bob’s information by considering
the mutual information I associated with the ensemble
E . From the Holevo bound [15], we obtain
I ≤ χ(E) ≡ S(ρB)− 1N
N−1∑
j=0
S(ρB(j)) , (43)
where ρB ≡
∑N−1
j=0 ρB(j)/N is the average state of B,
assuming that each of Alice’s queries is equiprobable. To
simplify this expression, it is useful to express ρB(j) as
ρB(j) = Pj σj + (1− Pj) σ˜j , (44)
where Pj is the average probability (18) that Bob will
pass the test while Alice is sending the j-th query, and
where σj and σ˜j are the density matrices
σj ≡ (P (a)j σ(a)j + P (b)j σ(b)j )/(2Pj) , (45)
σ˜j ≡ [(1− P (a)j ) σ˜(a)j + (1− P (b)j ) σ˜(b)j ]/[2(1− Pj)] .
This allows us to write also
ρB = P σ + (1− P ) σ˜ , (46)
with
σ ≡
N−1∑
j=0
Pj
NP σj , σ˜ ≡
N−1∑
j=0
1−Pj
N(1−P ) σ˜j , (47)
where P ≡∑j Pj/N is Bob’s average probability of pass-
ing the honesty test, which, according to Eq. (23), must
be greater than 1− ǫ. Equations (44) and (46) can then
be exploited to produce the following inequalities [10]
S(ρB) ≤ H2(P ) + P S(σ) + (1− P ) S(σ˜) ,
S(ρB(j)) ≥ Pj S(σj) + (1− Pj) S(σ˜j) , (48)
8where H2(x) ≡ −x log x− (1−x) log(1−x) is the binary
entropy. Therefore Eq. (43) gives
I ≤ H2(P ) + P χ({ PjNP ;σj}) + (1− P ) χ({
1−Pj
N(1−P ) ; σ˜j}),
where χ({ 1−PjN(1−P ) ; σ˜j}) is the Holevo information associ-
ated with a source characterized by probabilities
1−Pj
N(1−P ) .
This quantity can never be bigger than log2N (the same
applies to χ({ PjNP ;σj}), but we are not going to use it).
Therefore, we can write
I ≤ H2(P ) + P χ({ PjNP ;σj}) + (1 − P ) log2N, (49)
which shows that, in the limit in which P → 1, the upper
bound is only given by χ({ PjNP ;σj}). The claim is that
for P ∼ 1 this quantity vanishes. Indeed, according to
Eq. (26) we know that for ǫ→ 0 the density matrices σj
converge to the fixed state |Φ(2)0 〉B, hence
lim
P→1
χ({ Pj
NP
;σj}) = χ({ 1
N
; |Φ(2)0 〉}) = 0 . (50)
More generally, we now show that I can be bounded from
above to any value > 0 for P sufficiently close to 1.
In order to exploit the above relations to give a bound
on I, let us introduce the probabilities
qj ≡ 〈Φ(2)0 |σj |Φ(2)0 〉 ≥ 1− 630 ǫ1/4 , (51)
q ≡ 〈Φ(2)0 |σ|Φ(2)0 〉 =
N−1∑
j=0
Pj
NP qj ≥ 1− 630 ǫ1/4 , (52)
(the inequalities simply follow from Eq. (26)). We can
then write
σj = qj |Φ(2)0 〉〈Φ(2)0 |+ (1 − qj) τj +∆j ,
σ = q |Φ(2)0 〉〈Φ(2)0 |+ (1 − q) τ +∆ , (53)
where τj are density matrices formed by vectors |v⊥〉
orthogonal to |Φ(2)0 〉, ∆j are traceless operators con-
taining off-diagonal terms of the form |Φ(2)0 〉〈v⊥|, and
τ ≡ ∑j Pjτj/(NP ). We now introduce a unital com-
pletely positive trace preserving (CPT) map T which de-
stroys the off-diagonal terms |Φ(2)0 〉〈v⊥| while preserving
the corresponding diagonal terms, and observe that the
von Neumann entropy always increases under the action
of a unital map [16]. Therefore,
χ({ PjNP ;σj}) ≤ S(σ) ≤ S(T (σ))
= S(q |Φ(2)0 〉〈Φ(2)0 |+ (1− q) τ)
≤ H2(q) + (1− q)S(τ) . (54)
Now, since τ is a density matrix in B, the quantity S(τ)
can always be upper bounded by log2 dB with dB the
dimension of B. This is not very useful, as dB can be
arbitrarily large. However, a better solution can be ob-
tained. Indeed, we can show that the following inequality
holds:
S(τ) ≤ log2(2N) . (55)
To verify this, we note that the ensemble { PjNP ;σj} is
composed by N density matrices of the form (45) where
σ
(a)
j and σ
(b)
j are pure vectors satisfying the conditions
given in Eq. (26). For small ǫ, these 2N vectors are
parallel: therefore, there exists a partial isometry I con-
necting B to a Hilbert space B′ of dimension 2N which
maintains their relative distances intact. Applying such
an isometry to all elements of { PjNP ;σj} we obtain a new
ensemble { PjNP ;σ′j} of B′, whose elements satisfy to the
same relations as the original one. In particular, the two
ensembles possess the same value of χ (in fact, χ is an
entropic quantity, whose value depends only on the rela-
tions among the ensemble elements), i.e.
χ({ PjNP ;σj}) = χ({
Pj
NP ;σ
′
j}) , (56)
We can now apply to χ({ PjNP ;σ′j}) the inequalities (54):
the only difference being that now τ is a density matrix
of B′ and hence it satisfies the condition (55). Therefore,
we can conclude
χ({ PjNP ;σj}) ≤ H2(q) + (1− q) log2(2N) .
Replacing this into (49), we finally find
I ≤ H2(P ) + P H2(q) + (1− q) + (2− P − q) log2N .(57)
which thanks to Eq. (52), for sufficiently large N yields
Eq. (17). This means that Alice can limit Bob’s informa-
tion I, by employing in her tests a value of ǫ sufficiently
small.
V. QPQ VARIANTS AND ENTANGLEMENT
ASSISTED QPQ
In this section we discuss few variants of the QPQ
protocol that can be used to improve the security. In
particular we introduce an entanglement assisted QPQ
in which Alice entangles her registers Q1,2 with a local
ancilla before sending them to Bob. As before, we will
focus for simplicity on rhetoric versions of such variants,
even though similar considerations can be applied also to
other (non-rhetoric) QPQ versions.
An example of cheating strategy will allow us to put in
evidence the aspects of QPQ that these variants are able
to improve. Specifically, suppose that Bob performs a
projective measure on all of Alice’s queries to determine
the value of the index j. As we have seen in the previous
section, he will be by necessity disturbing Alice’s state in
average, so that she will have some finite probability to
find out he is cheating. However, if she had chosen sce-
nario a [see Eq. (4)], then Bob’s first measurement on Q1
9will return j. Now, suppose that his second measurement
on Alice’s second request Q2 returns the value “0” (this
happens with probability 1/2), then Bob will know that
Alice had chosen scenario a and that her query was j. In
this particular case, he will be able to evade detection if
he re-prepares the system Q2 in the state | + j〉Q2 . [Of
course, this does not mean that he will evade detection
in general, as this is a situation that is particularly lucky
for him, but that has only a small chance of presenting
itself. ] A simple variant of the QPQ protocol can be
used to reduce the success probability of this particular
cheating strategy and in general to strengthen the secu-
rity of the whole procedure. It consists in allowing Alice
to replace the superposition | + j〉Qk with states of the
form (|j〉Qk + eiθ|0〉Qk)/
√
2, the phase θ being a parame-
ter randomly selected by Alice. Since Bob does not know
the value of θ, it will be clearly impossible for him to re-
prepare the correct reply state after his measurement: as
a result his probability of cheating using the simple strat-
egy presented above will be decreased[19]. Furthermore
since for each given choice of θ, the results of Sec. IV
apply, one expects that the use of randomly selected θs
will result in a general security enhancement of the QPQ
protocol.
In the previous example, the parameter θ is a secret
parameter whose value, unknown to Bob, prevents him
from sending the correct answers to Alice. Another QPQ
variant employs entanglement to enhance security. Sup-
pose that, instead of presenting Bob with the states |j〉Qk
and | + j〉Qk = (|j〉Qk + |0〉Qk)/
√
2, as requested by the
QPQ protocol, Alice uses the states
|j〉Qk and | ∧ j〉QkA ≡
1√
2
[|j〉Qk |0〉A + |0〉Qk |j〉A] ,(58)
where the system A is an ancillary system that Alice
does not hand over to Bob. The protocol now follows the
same procedure as the “canonical” QPQ described previ-
ously, but employing the state | ∧ j〉 in place of the state
|+ j〉. Of course, Alice’s honesty test must be appropri-
ately modified, as she has to test whether Bob’s actions
have destroyed the entanglement between the ancillary
system A and the Qk register. The main difference with
the canonical QPQ is that here half of the times Bob has
only access to a part of an entangled state: he is even
more limited in re-preparing the states for Alice than
in the canonical QPQ. It is easy to see that the secu-
rity proof given in the previous sections can be straight-
forwardly extended to this version of the protocol, and
that the security bounds derived above still apply: indeed
they can be made even more stringent as Bob has only a
limited capacity in his transformations on Alice’s queries,
since he does not have access to the ancillary space A.
In the situations in which the information carriers em-
ployed in the queries can be put in a superposition of
traveling in different directions [17], this version of the
protocol can easily be reduced to the canonical QPQ by
simply supposing that Alice is in the possession of the
database element j = 0 corresponding to the rhetoric
question, while, obviously, Bob is in possession of all the
remaining database elements.
VI. WHAT IF ALICE CANNOT CHECK THE
ANSWER TO HER QUERIES INDEPENDENTLY
FROM BOB?
In deriving the QPQ protocol it is assumed that for
each query j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} there is a unique possible
answer Aj (notice however that two distinct queries can
have the same answer — i.e. Aj can coincides with Aj′ ).
One way to enforce this condition in a realistic scenario
is to admit the possibility that Alice can independently
verify the answer that Bob is sending to her[20]. In this
section we will show that if this is not the case then the
basic structure of QPQ does not prevent Bob to cheat
without being discovered by Alice. In Sec. VII we will
discuss how one can overcome these limitations, at least
temporarily, by allowing Alice (or third parties that col-
laborate with her) to reiterate her query at random times.
A. Successful cheating strategies for a database
with multiple valid answers
Here we drop the above hypothesis and give two ex-
amples of successful cheating strategies that allow Bob
to spy on Alice’s query, and still pass the honesty test
with probability 1.
1. Successful cheating for the rhetoric version of QPQ, for
databases with multiple valid answers
Let us start by considering the case of a database with
N = 3 possible entries in which both the query j = 1
and the query j = 2 admit two distinguishable answers.
In particular let A
(+)
1 , A
(−)
1 be the answers for j = 1 and
A
(+)
2 , A
(−)
2 those for j = 2.
Now, suppose that the unitary U
(1)
Q1RB
of Eq. (5) that
Bob applies to Q1RB performs the following mapping
|0〉Q1 |0〉R1 |0〉B → |0〉Q1 |A0〉R1 |0〉B ,
|1〉Q1 |0〉R1 |0〉B → |1〉Q1 |A
(+)
1 〉R1 |+1〉B+|A
(−)
1 〉R1 |−1〉B√
2
,
|2〉Q1 |0〉R1 |0〉B → |2〉Q1 |A
(+)
2 〉R1 |+2〉B+|A
(−)
2 〉R1 |−2〉B√
2
,
where |A0〉 is the answer to the rhetoric query and where
| ± 1〉B ≡ |0〉B ± |1〉B√
2
, | ± 2〉B ≡ |0〉B ± |2〉B√
2
,(59)
with |0〉B, |1〉B and |2〉B being orthonormal states of
Bob’s space B. Analogously define U
(2)
Q2R2B
as the uni-
tary operator which performs the following transforma-
tion |0〉Q1 |0〉R2 |ψ〉B → |0〉Q2 |A0〉R2 |ψ〉B for all |ψ〉B of B
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and
|1〉Q1 |0〉R2 | ± 1〉B → |1〉Q2 |A(±)1 〉R2 | ± 1〉B ,
|2〉Q1 |0〉R2 | ± 2〉B → |2〉Q2 |A(±)2 〉R2 | ± 3〉B . (60)
According to the above assumptions, if Alice’s query is
the rhetoric one (i.e j = 0) the final state (5) of the QPQ
protocol is |0〉Q2 |A0〉R2 |0〉Q1 |A0〉R1 |0〉B. In this case Bob
passes the test and gets |0〉B as output state. For j = 2, 3,
instead, we have two possibilities. In the scenario ℓ =a
the final state will be
|j〉Q2 |A
(+)
j
〉R2+|0〉Q2 |A0〉R2
2 |j〉Q1 |A
(+)
j 〉R1 |+ j〉B
+
|j〉Q2 |A
(−)
j 〉R2+|0〉Q2 |A0〉R2
2 |j〉Q1 |A
(−)
j 〉R1 | − j〉B ,
while in the scenario ℓ =b it will be
|j〉Q1 |A
(+)
j
〉R1+|0〉Q1 |A0〉R1
2 |j〉Q2 |A
(+)
j 〉R2 |+ j〉B
+
|j〉Q1 |A
(−)
j
〉R1+|0〉Q1 |A0〉R1
2 |j〉Q2 |A
(−)
j 〉R2 | − j〉B .
This means that independently from the selected value of
ℓ Alice will receive the answer A
(+)
j half of the times and
the answer A
(−)
j in the other half of the times, while Bob
will always pass the honesty test. Moreover in the case
in which Alice receives the answer A
(+)
j , Bob will get the
state |+ j〉B while in the case in which Alice receives the
answer A
(−)
j Bob will get the state | − j〉B . In average
the state B is (|0〉B〈0|+ |j〉B〈j|B)/2.
In conclusion, using U (1) and U (2) as in the previous
paragraphs, Bob will always pass the honesty test. Fur-
thermore the output state of B he gets at the end of the
protocol will be partially correlated with the query j as
follows:
Query output state B
j = 0 |0〉B〈0|
j = 1 (|0〉B〈0|+ |1〉B〈1|)/2
j = 2 (|0〉B〈0|+ |2〉B〈2|)/2
(61)
Therefore by performing a simple von Neumann measure-
ment on B, Bob will be able to extract some information
on j, without Alice having any chance of detecting it.
Notice that, in the example presented here, Bob’s
info is limited by the partial overlap between the states
|0〉B〈0|, (|0〉B〈0| + |1〉B〈1|)/2 and (|0〉B〈0| + |2〉B〈2|)/2.
However, this is not a fundamental limitation as one can
construct more complex examples (e.g. databases with
more than two possible answers for a single query) for
which the amount of info that Bob acquires on j can be
arbitrarily high. It is also important to stress that the
above example can be used also to show that Bob will be
able to cheat also in the case in which Alice adopts QPQ
strategies more sophisticated then the simple rhetoric
version discussed in this paper (e.g. instead of sending
superpositions of the form (|j〉+ |0〉)/√2 she sends arbi-
trary superpositions α|j〉 + β|0〉 with α and β arbitrary
amplitudes that only she knows).
2. Successful cheating for the non-rhetoric version of QPQ,
for databases with multiple valid answers
Here we analyze how multiple valid answers may affect
the performance of the non-rhetoric version of the QPQ
protocol (i.e. where Alice is not using the rhetoric ques-
tion j = 0). We give an example of a successful cheating
strategy for a database with N = 3 queries. For the sake
of simplicity, we will assume that j = 0, 1 have single an-
swers A0 and A1 respectively, but that j = 2 is associated
with two distinguishable answers A
(±)
2 . As an example
of a non-rhetoric QPQ protocol we consider the case in
which Alice, to get the information associated with the
j query, chooses another query (say the j′-th one) and
sends sequentially, in random order, states of the form
α|j〉+ β|j′〉, |j〉 and |j′〉 (α and β being amplitudes that
only she knows).
As in the case of the rhetoric version of the protocol,
Bob’s action can be described by unitaries. In this case
they are U (1),U (2) and U (3). Notice that the first acts on
Q1RB the second on Q2R2R3B and the third on Q3R3B,
with obvious choice of the notation for the subspaces in-
volved. For our present purpose, it is sufficient to as-
sume that for k = 1, 2, 3, U (k) acts non-trivially only on
QkRkB (this is a particular instance of the general case).
We can also assume that U (1),U (2) and U (3) are identical.
We then define such operators according to the following
rules:
U
(k)
QkRkB
(|j〉Qk |0〉Rk |0〉B) = |j〉Qk |Aj〉Rk|0〉B ,
U
(k)
QkRkB
(|j〉Qk |0〉Rk |2〉B) = |j〉Qk |Aj〉Rk|2〉B ,
if j = 0, 1 while, for j = 2,
U
(k)
QkRkB
(|2〉Qk |0〉Rk |0〉B)
= |2〉Qk
(|A(+)2 〉Rk |+ 2〉B + |A(−)2 〉Rk | − 2〉B
)
/
√
2 ,
U
(k)
QkRkB
(|2〉Qk |0〉Rk |2〉B) = |2〉Qk |A(±)2 〉Rk|2〉B ,
where | ± 2〉B are defined in Eq. (59). If initial state of
the B is |0〉B, one can easily verify that Bob will always
pass Alice’s honesty test (no matter which superposition
α|j〉+ β|j′〉 she is using) and that he can recover part of
the information associated with the query. In this simple
example, for instance, he has a not null probability to
identify the query j = 2. As before, this counterexample
can be easily generalized and improved.
VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The case in which different answers may correspond to
the same query is, of course, quite relevant, so that it is
natural to ask if the QPQ protocol can be modified to
apply also to this situation. In this section we give some
methods that allow Alice to foil the cheating strategies
described in the previous section temporarily, for as long
as Bob is expecting further queries.
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In the case in which Alice can independently check how
many different replies correspond to the each query (and
which are they), then there is a simple solution that pre-
vents Bob from cheating: we must require Bob to provide
all possible replies in a pre-established order (e.g. alpha-
betically) when he is presented the jth query. In this
way, each query has again a unique composite answer
(composed by the ordered succession of all the possible
answers), so that we are reduced to the canonical QPQ
protocol, and Bob is prevented from cheating.
If, however, Alice cannot independently establish the
number of different replies to each query, then a different
strategy is necessary. [Note that the security proofs given
in Sects. III and IV cease to apply to this version of the
protocol, although conceivably they may be extended to
cover also this situation.]
First of all, we must require that each of the possible
replies to the jth query is uniquely indexed by Bob. This
means that there should be a unique answer to the ques-
tion “What is the kth possible reply to the jth query?”
Of course, this by itself is insufficient to guarantee that
Bob cannot employ the cheating strategies of the previous
section, as Alice cannot independently check the unique-
ness of Bob’s indexing (since she does not know all the
possible answers to the jth query). However, she can
check whether Bob will always answer in the same way
to repeated queries. From Eqs. (60) and (61), it follows
that, as soon as Bob measures his system B, he might
gain information on the value of j, but at the same time
he loses information on which (among all the possible an-
swers to the jth query) he had presented to Alice. If he
wants to be sure that he keeps on providing always the
same answer to repeated queries on Alice’s part, he must
preserve his system B without trying to extract informa-
tion from it. He can measure the system B only when he
is confident that Alice will not be asking him the same
query anymore. In a multi-party scenario, we can also
think of a situation where multiple cooperating parties
ask Bob the same queries and compare the replies they
receive from him. If they find that his answers when he
is asked the kth reply to the jth query to do not match,
then they can conclude that he has been cheating: he has
not assigned a unique index to all the possible replies to
the jth query, and he has taken advantage of the cheating
strategies detailed in the previous section.
Bob is thus placed in the awkward situation of possess-
ing information on Alice’s query in the system B entirely
in his possession, but of being prevented from accessing
such information. This is a temporary solution, since,
as soon as Bob is certain that he will not be asked the
jth query anymore, he can measure the system B and
extract the information stored on it. He is kept honest
only as long as he is in business (and, of course, he is in
business only as long as he is honest).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, we have given a security proof of the
QPQ protocol introduced in [8]. It is based on quanti-
tative information-disturbance tradeoffs which place an
upper bound on the information Bob can retain on Al-
ice’s query in terms of the disturbance he is producing on
the states that he is handing back to her (see Sects. III
and IV). A nonzero information retained by Bob implies
a nonzero disturbance on Alice’s states, which she can
detect with a simple measurement (the “honesty test”).
If the honesty test fails, she can conclude that Bob has
certainly cheated. If, on the other hand, the test passes,
she can tentatively conclude that Bob has not cheated
(although she cannot be certain of it).
In addition, we have given some variants of the proto-
col to further increase Alice’s security, i.e. to reduce Bob’s
probability of evading detection when cheating. These
variants either exploit secret parameters, or exploit en-
tanglement with an ancillary system Alice retains in her
possession (see Sect. V).
Finally, we have seen that Bob can successfully cheat
without being detected if we drop the assumption (which
is at the basis of the QPQ protocol) that to each query
there can be associated only a single answer Aj (see
Sect. VI). In fact, if we assume that there exist two (or
more) different replies Aj 6= A′j to the query j, then Bob
can find out the value of j, evading detection by Alice
with certainty. We discussed some strategies that allow
Alice to protect herself also in this situation, at least as
long as Bob can expect further queries from her or from
other parties who may cooperate with her (see Sect. VII).
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